Bombings and Boko Haram (Part II)

The insurgency continues in Maiduguri and though conversations aren't solely centered around the violence there, Boko Haram maintains its grip on the go-to subject in Nigeria. However, instead of looking at the issue in its current, bloody incarnation, I'd prefer to use it as a model for conflict in general, especially here in Nigeria.

I'll refer to a model from the Conflict Research Consortium, more essays and diagrams can be found here:



Ah, the majestic bell curve. The simple beauty of statistics, literary arcs, and bellmakers. The Boko Haram latent conflict can be traced back to the vestiges of colonialism and the divide and rule tactics of the British. In Nigeria, the British allowed for indirect rule of the northern states, which, from the time of the Fulani jihads, had a feudal system based on the religious power of the Sokoto caliphate. As part of this system, the British did not allow missionaries to evangelize in the North, nor did they spread the Western system of education in the Northern states.

Boko Haram, as previously mentioned, is Hausa for "Western education is forbidden." The group is extremist to say the least, but if one were to take them at their name, the foundation of their grievances is the challenge that they perceive Western education systems present to their way of life. So let's just call that the latent conflict in this scenario.

The conflict emerged through the creation of this organization and their call for an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria. Now at this point, the curve can diverge: conflict can escalate or a peace may be negotiated. It was obviously not in the Nigerian state's interest to negotiate the secession of a significant chunk of the country.

Here's where the conflict escalates: Boko Haram is a militant organization, but there are rumors that several politicians used the group for electioneering purposes. Hired thugs are unfortunately all too common in a country where 46% of the youth are unemployed. The justice system is egregiously broken in much of Nigeria as well, so the few arrests that have been made target only the foot soldiers, not the "big men" pulling the strings.

Two years ago, however, the military got involved and captured the group's leader, Muhammed Yusuf. They turned him over, and it looked like the conflict would enter a period of de-escalation and the group might fade back into obscurity. However, after the military turned Yusuf over to the police, years of impunity were transformed with a little street justice, and Yusuf was dead before he ever reached a court for trial. Since his arrest and extrajudicial execution, Boko Haram has experienced a resurgence, freeing 300 of its members from a prison in Bauchi last year and virtually taking over the city of Maiduguri.

Now the state and Boko Haram have entered the stalemate. The military operation in Maiduguri is ongoing, but the organization, like all asymmetric powers, has gone underground and rumors persist that there are cells like it all over the north. The army has been accused of human rights abuses in Maiduguri in part because they cannot differentiate civilian from combatant and are under constant pressure from improvised explosives that kill soldiers daily. Boko Haram itself says that it refuses to negotiate with a government trying to kill its members. That's not exactly crazy, as the last time one of them pitched up at the police station, he wound up dead.

So as the violence continues to unfold in Maiduguri, it will remain to be seen whether the conflict will rise, fall, or remain in its current stasis. As long as the military crackdown continues, I'm sure it will remain the topic of conversation.